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Guido Calabresit
There is something odd about taking part in a discussion of one's own
work. My mother-in-law was an artist and she hated to go to exhibitions of her
paintings. She felt naked as people looked at her works and discussed them
almost as if she weren't there. It is much the same when one listens to one's
writings being analyzed. "Did I say that? Did I really say that? Of course I
didn't say that!" Or conversely, "Of course I said that! Who could possibly
think that I didn't? Obviously that idea was there. Anyone could tell it was
there!" But who is to say whether it really was there in a meaningful sense?
As a teacher of products liability, I guess I'm committed to the notion that
once one creates a product, an artifact, that artifact must speak for itself, it
must be taken with all that its users find in it, or find to be missing from it.
And one can't completely exonerate oneself from the damage done by a
plausible use of the product by saying, "I didn't mean for it to be used that
way." Still, one is tempted to suggest how one's artifact should and should not
be used, and so here I am.
I'm very glad to see that Doug Melamed is also here; I wanted him to
spring unexpected out of a cake-unfortunately there is no cake. But he is
here, and you have had a chance to listen to him. I especially wanted him here
because over the years many people have asked me, "Who was Melamed?" as
if he didn't exist, as if he weren't one of the country's leading lawyers. Most
of you, like me, are teachers and scholars, and we sometimes think of the
world as one in which only scholarly achievements matter. We are, of course,
quite wrong.
There was a man named Nathan Young, who graduated from the Yale Law
School in 1918. He founded the NAACP in Missouri, and later became the
first African-American judge in Missouri. On the seventieth anniversary of his
graduation, he came back to the law school and spoke at commencement. To
place him among his classmates, I got a list of the people who had graduated
with him in 1918. Among them was Karl Llewellyn. Naturally, I asked Young
if he knew Llewellyn and he said, "Karl Llewellyn ... of course I knew Karl,
we wrote a paper together-bright fellow ... What ever became of him?" So
t Judge, United states Court of Appeals for the Second Cttcuit; Sterhng Professor Emnertus of Law
and Professorial Lecturer in Law, Yale Law School.
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if any of you don't know who Doug is, and what he has done, remember, it's
a narrow world we live in.
I'd like to begin talking about The Cathedral with a bit of legal thought.
Or rather, with some history of legal thought, if I may so dignify what I will
say. First, a matter of timing: This article was written in the spring of 1971.
It was written at about the same time that Dick Posner's review of The Costs
of Accidents came out. In that review, Posner stated that he was not a torts
lawyer, but then neither was Calabresi, because anyone who was doing
something so startling as to use economic analysis of law to discuss accidents
was not really talking about torts.' In 1971, Mitch Polinsky was just starting
as a graduate student at MIT. Nick Tideman, who, along with Saul Levmore,
has done the most interesting work on self-assessment, had barely finished his
Ph.D. at Harvard. Jules Coleman was not that long past puberty, and Jody
Kraus was probably still in knee-pants. At that time, most people believed that
economic analysis of law was crazy stuff.
Perhaps for that reason this article was almost rejected. It had been
commissioned by the Harvard Law Review because I was a visiting professor
at Harvard that year. When the editors looked at it, though, they were so
startled by my way of approaching things that they nearly turned it down.
(They ultimately published it with fewer changes than were made by editors
in any other article I have written, but only after I was able to explain to them
face-to-face what the piece was about.)
This context explains the simplicity, what Saul has kindly called "the
elegance," of the model.2 The lack of any nuances, of any sub-rules and sub-
sub-rules stems from the fact that, as simple as the model was, it was
nonetheless almost too complex for its time. Susan Rose-Ackerman, in her
classic article, has, for instance, sorted out many different types of
inalienability: when one can give, but cannot sell; when one can sell, but
cannot destroy; and so forth.3 All these (and other) crucial distinctions were
omitted from The Cathedral not because I had the sense to make the model
simple and elegant. They were left out because I had to make it simple so that
people would understand it.
Ironically, the model's lack of complexity has been one of the reasons why
The Cathedral has had so much influence. The simplicity of the article made
it little more than an outline-a way of looking at things. As such, it leaves
room for others. They can complicate the structure. They can use the model
in areas different from those that spawned it. They can criticize it for its
1. See Richard A. Posner, The Costs of Accidents-A Legal and Economic Analysis, 37 U. CI. L.
REV. 636, 636 (1970).
2. See Saul Levmore, Unifying Remedies: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Startling Rules, 106
YALE L.J. 2149, 2155 (1997).
3. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REv.
931, 934-35 (1985).
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omissions and want of subtlety, while at the same time relying on it. Of such
versatility is influence made.
Second, I would like to talk about what Carol Rose has felicitously called
"the shadow example."4 What was it that drove me to write the article? The
most scholarly, and hence the best, review of The Costs of Accidents came out
early in 1971. It was Frank Michelman's A Non-Accidental Perspective on
Calabresi's Costs.5 In it, Frank took my discussion of accidents and showed
how one could use the same type of economic analysis in other contexts. He
adapted it to nuisance because he was teaching property. It was not surprising
that he should choose nuisance since that is the field that lies right at the
confluence of torts and property. His important work gave inspiration to my
article.
Gary Becker was also a source, not in the sense of being an inspiration,
but rather because I found one of his articles to be quite disturbing.6 In that
article, Becker described criminal law as a simple pricing mechanism in which
the penalty for a crime should be the value of a stolen good multiplied by the
chances of not getting caught. And that seemed silly to me. I found it odd that
Becker-who I thought would be appalled if, in the property context, anyone
were allowed to demand your watch or your land in exchange for what some
state agency said it was worth-seemed to say just that in a criminal setting.
I said, "Becker can't mean it. Something is wrong with his analysis." Looking
for what was wrong led me to the distinction between property and liability
rules. Of course, looking for what was wrong also meant thinking about torts,
contracts, and criminal law not as separate fields, but, rather, as all part of one
system. And that, as Richard Epstein has so perceptively noted, is highly
subversive.7
Eminent domain is the model for both Rules 3 and 4. Of course, the
situations in which we allow people to take some other person's goods freely
after paying a collectively set price for the goods (a kind of private eminent
domain) are very different from the situations in which people are only given
the right to engage in activities that entail the distinct possibility (or almost
certainty) that harm will befall others as a consequence. And they are different
even though in the latter all that the actors need to do, once harm has occurred,
is also to pay a collectively set price by way of compensation. But still, such
situations-like driving a car or building a bridge, for example-are even more
different from those that we regulate by contract. And this is so regardless of
whether one views contracts as Epstein does, or if one accepts the so-called
4. Carol M. Rose, The Shadow ofThe Cathedral. 106 YALE LJ 2175. 2176 (1997).
5. Frank I. Michelman, Pollution as Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabrest's Costs. 80
YALE L. 647 (1971).
6. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punislunent: An Economic Approach, 76 J. PoL ECON. 169 (1968).
7. See Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106
YALE L.J. 2091, 2103-05 (1997).
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Holmesian heresy that people have a right to breach a contract and pay
damages.'
In the end though, The Cathedral did not intend to take sides on whether
Holmes or Epstein is right, or even on whether we should price crimes in the
way Becker seemed to suggest. It was intended to provide a framework, a little
simple-minded model, that would give rise to boxes and thereby encourage
scholars to see whether there might be situations in the world that filled those
boxes. It was designed to help us shed light on things that the common law
method left in the dark. One of these was the 4th Rule. There were virtually
no cases at common law exemplifying this Rule. As a result, legal scholars,
who looked only at cases, did not realize its existence. And this was so even
though outside of appellate cases-in the administrative world, in eminent
domain, and in all sorts of other areas-the 4th Rule, as Melamed has said, is
alive and well.9
In addition, the article was a way of saying that we can look at a situation
and consider whether one rule is more appropriate than another in terms that
go beyond efficiency and allow decisionmakers to respond, for example, to
distributional desires as well. It is for this reason that I have relatively little
patience with the debate over which is more efficient, a property rule or a
liability rule when transaction costs are high or low. This debate is certainly
worth having, but it is not as interesting as the question of when we want to
use one remedy rather than another for broader reasons.
I have one more point about intellectual history, and that concerns young
James Atwood. Most of you don't know about Atwood. But when you read all
of these Essays, you will learn that he was a student, who, in a law review
Note in 1969, pointed out the existence of a 4th rule.' I wish he too were
here-I'd like to meet him. I am very glad he was found. The Atwoods of this
world should be recognized; they are always there! As Itzak Englard pointed
out in writing about my article, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts, and
its definition of causal link or causal tendency," some people had said the
same thing in German in the nineteenth century. 2 Even if they are ignored
at the time, such people should always be given credit later when the idea they
8. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 301 (1881) ("The only universal consequence
of a legally binding promise is, that the law makes the promisor pay damages if the promised event does
not come to pass."). Epstein argues that the remedies for breach encompass not only damages, but also in
the appropriate case, specific performance. See Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract
Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 741 (1984).
9. See A. Douglas Melamed, Remarks: A Public Law Perspective, 106 YALE L.J. 2209, 2209 (1997).
10. See James R. Atwood, Note, An Economic Analysis of Land Use Conflicts, 21 STAN. L. REV. 293,
315 (1969).
11. See Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69 (1975).
12. See Izhak Englard, Victor Mataja's Liability for Damages from an Economic Viewpoint: A
Centennial to an Ignored Economic Analysis of Tort, 10 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 173, 179 (1990)
(describing Austrian scholar's 1888 book, which was published in German and largely ignored in American
scholarship).
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expressed, perhaps too soon, becomes popular as a result of someone else's
writings. For this reason, the fact that Atwood has now been found delights
me.
13
I would now like to share a few thoughts on substance. Of course, the so-
called remedy defines the nature of the right, as Jules Coleman and Jody
Kraus, 4 and Carol Rose have said.'5 Indeed, I (probably incorrectly) thought
I had said as much in the article itself. The nature of the entitlement depends
on the circumstances; property rules and liability rules do not attach to
things-not to cars, watches, lands, or bodies---they only attach to things in
particular circumstances, in a particular context. When does society or its legal
system give you a right to take my entitlement? When does society give you
a right to act in ways that may cause such a taking to occur? When does it do
it by saying you can pay X amount, or by making you pay Y, or Y plus Z?
For that matter, when does society say you must pay Y plus Z, but you
must also suffer stigma, because society doesn't really want you to take my
entitlement? When does society say not only must you pay but we will also
kick you out of the trade association, or use the rack, the whip, or the thumb-
screw on you if you take my entitlement unilaterally? These are the questions
that are ultimately worth asking. And that is why I find the abstract discussion
of when property rules are better than liability rules not all that helpful. I find
the discussion instead very helpful when it takes place in a context, when it
asks in a given situation why one rule is better than another.
And of course, the cost of costing is important. So when Krier and Schwab
say that we must always take into account how much it costs to define the
amount of compensation to be given, they are right. 16 But we must equally
take into account what it costs people to define the price at which they would
sell, if we were to use property rules instead. Most of the time we think this
latter cost is not much. Yet the moment one thinks of all the
attempts-whether they are through sequential auctions" or self-
assessments' 8-at determining the price at which a person will sell, one
13. After the AALS session, Doug Melamed told me something that sheds yet more light on how ideas
proliferate. Atwood and Melamed had been students in the same seminar taught at Yale College by C.
Edward Lindblom, a great and innovative scholar whose work--between political science and
economics-was troublesome to both fields. I too studied with Lindblom, though considerably earlier. I do
not think for a moment that Lindblom "taught" us Rule 4. and neither does Melamed. But is it too far-
fetched to think that Lindblom's characteristic and unusual approach encouraged three of his students to
look at things in a way that would lead to the same insight?
14. See Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights. 95 YALE LJ 1335.
1342-43 (1986).
15. See Rose, supra note 4, at 2179.
16. See James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: Tte Cathedral in
Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 440, 454-55 (1995).
17. See Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules. Liablity Rules, and
Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703 (1996).
18. See Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law. 68 VA L REV. 771
(1982).
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realizes how high the latter cost can also be. Then we are back to Coase's
insight-there is no free lunch. Everything has costs: There is a cost to liability
ways of shifting entitlements, and there is also a cost to any other way of
doing it. Inevitably these relative costs are important factors to consider in
deciding which approach to use in any particular situation. It will influence
when we will let people get entitlements by paying a collectively set price and
when, instead, we will require them to pay a negotiated price. It will also
influence whether, if they don't pay a negotiated price, we will assess "extra"
or punitive damages, throw them in jail, or simply throw them out of the
country club.
I'd like to close by mentioning two current special interests that I have in
this area. The first is "splitting." I think the major change in tort law in the last
thirty years (a change as important as the coming of insurance was seventy
years ago) is the fact that we no longer are governed solely by "all-or-nothing"
rules. 9 Dramatically, since the coming of comparative negligence, we split
damages all the time and in all sorts of ways. We are splitting between faulty
and non-faulty behavior that combine to cause injury, for example. Someday
we may even be splitting proximate cause, saying, yes, there is a proximate
cause, but it is only somewhat proximate, so the plaintiff should get part, but
not all, of the damages suffered. The whole nineteenth-century notion that
recovery is an all-or-nothing thing is disappearing. Moreover, the increasing
use of liability rules is another example of this very phenomenon because
liability rules produce splits. As Carol Rose has pointed out, they allow for
forms of splitting that are remarkably complicated.2' As a result, I'd like to
see more work done with The Cathedral rules as techniques for splitting.
The other thing that I'm interested in these days is bodies: whether we
own our own bodies and body parts, and who owns them, who has a right to
them, if we don't. That's the context in which I'd like to ask whether and
when we have rights protected by property rules, semi-property rules, sub-rules
of the sort Rose-Ackerman wrote about,2' or reverse rules. Can I claim that
you are injuring me if you don't give me the body part that I need for a
transplant? Does the possessor of the functioning body part then have the right
to invoke the Krier-Schwab rule, saying, "Okay, I'll give it to you, but you
must pay me the damages you sought from me when you were trying to induce
me to give it to you?" I especially like the idea of looking at these rules in the
impossible context of body parts, where most of us say (even more than in
property) that what is mine is mine, but where it turns out (just as it did in the
19. See Guido Calabresi & Jeffrey 0. Cooper, New Directions in Tort Law, 30 VALPARAISO U. L.
REv. 859, 868-83 (1996).
20. See Rose, supra note 4, at 2182-87.
21. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 3, at 949-51.
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context of property) that sometimes that is not so. Once again, I am inclined
to conclude that the article's simple framework may be useful in surprising
ways in analyzing body parts. If so, the next twenty-five years of The
Cathedral are assured.
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